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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is twofold: First, to present an approach and a
solution for analyzing the stability of coalition structures: We deﬁne a coali-
tional system (a set and a binary relation on that set) that explains the tran-
sitions between coalition structures and we propose to solve these systems
using the absorbing sets solution for abstract systems. Second, to perform
an analysis of this approach to evidence its utility in determining the sta-
ble coalition structures for some socioeconomic problems. We ﬁnd that the
absorbing sets solution efﬁciently solves this class of coalitional systems.
Key words: Coalition structures, coalitional systems and absorbing sets
solution.
Dpto. Ftos. del An´ alisis Econ´ omico and Instituto de Econom´ ıa P´ ublica. University of the
Basque Country.
yDept. of Mathematics. Maastricht University.
zDpto. Ftos. del An´ alisis Econ´ omico. University of the Basque Country.
xWe thank F. Grafe for his participation in the early stages of the paper, M. Oosten for dis-
cussions during the later stages and S. Barber` a, D. Vermeulen and J. Arin for helpful comments.
Financial support from University of the Basque Country projects: UPV-036.321-HA116/98, UPV-
036.321-HA042/99, UPV-00031.321-HA7903/2000, Basque Government project: GV PI-1998-68
and Ministerio de Educaci´ on y Ciencia (Government of Spain) project: BEC2000-0875 is gratefully
acknowledged.
11 Introduction
This paper deals with the question of stability of coalition structures.
Let us start with a brief explanation of this problem. Players usually form coali-
tions because they ﬁnd it proﬁtable to do so and, in many socioeconomic situations,
the proﬁts that these coalitions derive are not independent of how the remaining play-
ers are organized. The emerging coalitions of players give rise to conﬁgurations (or
coalition structures) with which some players may be satisﬁed, but others may want
to change. The decision to move is motivated by the payoffs that players can obtain
in each of the possible conﬁgurations. Thus players, trying to improve their situation,
force the transition from one coalition structure to another. In this paper we consider
how players (some or all) may move successively in discrete steps until they converge
upon some stable coalition structures.
In particular, the purpose of this paper is twofold: First, to present an approach
and a solution for analyzing this problem. The approach is simple: We endow an
abstract system (a set of alternatives and a binary relation on that set) with a struc-
ture capable of explaining the transitions between coalition structures, that we call
coalitional systems. We propose to solve these systems by means of the absorbing
sets solution for abstract systems. Second, to perform an analysis of the proposed
approach to evidence its utility in determining stable coalition structures. That is, we
deﬁne a class of coalitional systems that we call symmetric cooperative which con-
tains systems derived from coalition formation problems insocioeconomic situations.
We ﬁnd that the absorbing sets solution efﬁciently solves this class of coalitional sys-
tems.
Let us now be more explicit about the content of this paper. To analyze the sta-
bility of coalition structures we start with a set of players N and a partition function
' which associates each possible coalition structure (or partition of the set N) with a
payoff vector. Then, by looking at these vectors, we deﬁne a binary relation on the set
of coalition structures that formalizes the transitional process between them. How-
ever, we ﬁnd that this binary relation allows the survival of non plausible transitions.
Therefore, our following step is to remove these non plausible transitions, trying to
leave only the credible ones. After this ﬁltering process, we are left with a set of
2coalition structures and a binary relation on that set that is called a coalitional sys-
tem. We believe that this coalitional system approach provides considerable insight
into the dynamics of coalition formation.
We come now to the selected deﬁnition of stability. In this paper we consider
that players are myopic in the sense that when confronted with a possible transition,
they do not wonder about further deviations from the transition under consideration.
Furthermore, we do not consider time horizon or explicit stopping criteria to end the
transitional process that leads from one coalition structure to another. This means
that players can change coalition structures indeﬁnitely unless some natural stable
coalition structure is reached. In accordance with these ideas we have selected the
absorbing sets solution for solving our coalitional systems. Each absorbing set co-
incides with the elementary dynamic solution1 for an abstract system introduced by
Shenoy [1979] and the absorbing sets solution is the collection of all the absorbing
sets. The stability notion of this solution implies that with any two alternatives in
an absorbing set one dominates the other, if not directly then through a path. More-
over no alternative outside an absorbing set dominates an alternative in the set, even
through a path. Hence this solution contains sets that either consist of only one alter-
native or whose alternatives are in a cycle. Of course, alternatives not in an absorbing
set are ruled out as unstable. A nice property of this solution is that it always exists al-
though, in general, it may not be unique. A second solution for abstract games is also
considered: The generalized stable sets solution of van Deemen [1991]. The stability
notion of this solution is that in each generalized stable set there isno dominance rela-
tion, not even through a path, between any two distinct alternatives. Moreover, every
alternative outside a generalized stable set is dominated, either directly or through
a path, by some alternative in the set. We ﬁnd an interesting relation between the
two solutions considered: Any set formed by picking up one element of each of the
absorbing sets is generalized stable.
In the second part of this paper, we formulate some assumptions on the parti-
1The union of all distinct elementary dynamic solutions for an abstract game is the dynamic
solution introduced by Shenoy [1979]. This solution, under the name of the admissible set, was
previously deﬁned by Kalai, Schmeidler and Pazner [1976]. Schwartz [1974] also introduces an
equivalent deﬁnition. See also Kalai and Schmeidler [1977] for an analysis of the admissible set in
social bargaining processes.
3tion function which give rise to a class of coalitional systems that we call symmetric
cooperative. For these systems, whose alternatives are coalition structures, there is
only one absorbing set. Hence, the problem of multiplicity of absorbing sets is over-
come. As we shall see, our results allow us to identify the structure of this set, that
is, the type of coalition structures in the unique absorbing set, as well as the transi-
tions between them. Moreover, the established relation between the absorbing sets
and the generalized stable sets solutions shows that every coalition structure in the
unique absorbing set is in turn, a generalized stable set according to van Deemen’s
deﬁnition. Some socioeconomic examples illustrate the interest of symmetric coop-
erative systems. The ﬁrst, is a simple social organization model, which is introduced
mainly for illustrative purposes. The second is a numerical example derived from the
well-known standard Cournot oligopoly model. The approach followed in this paper
allows us to determine the unique absorbing set for both examples.
The paper is organized as follows: The coalitional system approach is introduced
in Section 2. In Section 3 we give the deﬁnition of the absorbing sets solution, of
the generalized stable sets solution, as well as the relation between the two. Section
4 contains the deﬁnition of symmetric cooperative systems and the determination of
the unique absorbing set for this class of systems. The two socioeconomic exam-
ples are presented in Section 5, while the proofs concerning the results of the social
organization system are in the appendix.
2 Coalitional systems
In this section we describe an approach, called the coalitional system, for analyzing
the stability of coalition structures.
As stated in the introduction, players usually form coalitions because they ﬁnd
it proﬁtable to do so. These groupings of players give rise to coalition structures
with which some players may be satisﬁed but others are not, and the later may want
to move to other coalition structures. We analyze how some (or all) players may
movesuccessively indiscrete steps until they converge upon somecoalition structures
which are stable.
We assume that the decision to move from one coalition structure to other is
4motivated by the payoffs that players can obtain in them. These payoffs are provided
by a partition function2. Formally,
Let N be a set of players. Denote by P a coalition structure (or a partition of the
set N) and by P(N) the set of all coalition structures formed with the set N.
Deﬁnition 1 Apartition function isafunction ' :P(N)  ! I RN. '(P) = ('1(P);:::;'n(P))
denotes the vector of payoffs when the players form coalition structure P.
Taking into account these payoff vectors we deﬁne a binary relation over the set
of coalition structures which deﬁnes a coalitional system. Thus,
Deﬁnition 2 A coalitional system is a pair (P(N);sdom), where sdom is a binary
relation deﬁned on P(N).
Notice that a coalitional system is merely a speciﬁed abstract system. (An ab-
stract system is a set of alternatives X and a binary relation R on that set3).
Let us start with an example in order to explain our approach.
Example 1 Let N = f1;2;3g and let ' be a partition function that gives the follow-
ing payoff vectors: '(f1gf2gf3g)=(5;4;3), '(f12gf3g)=(4;4;8),
'(f13gf2g)=(9;4;9), '(f23gf1g)=(4;7;7), '(f123g)=(6;6;6).
By looking at the payoff vectors, let us consider some of the transitions among
coalition structures. For example, we can infer that coalitions of players 3, 13 and 23
can force transition from f123g to ff12gf3gg, ff13gf2gg and ff23gf1gg respec-
tively; while it is not in the interest of any player to go from f123g to ff1gf2gf3gg.
Note also that although player 2 would like to go from ff13gf2gg to ff23gf1gg
this will not happen, since with this move player 3 would be damaged. (Digraph 1
represents the transitions which are formalized in Deﬁnitions 3 and 4.)
However, all these transitions do not seem equally credible. For example, transi-
tion from ff1gf2gf3gg to ff123gg via coalition 123 seems implausible since players
2A deﬁnition of the partition function can be found in Lucas and Macceli [1978]. See also Lucas
and Thrall [1963].
3These systems can be represented by means of a directed graph (digraph) the vertices of which
are the elements of the set X and the arcs represent the binary relation between them. We use this
representation in most of our examples.
51 and 3 would rather go to ff13gf2gg and they can make it. The idea behind this ob-
servation implies that a transition that might be carried out by a coalition will never
occur when there exists a subcoalition whose members could get higher payoffs by
going to another coalition structure. Thus, additionally to the capability to force a
transition, internal consistency is also required. (Digraph 2 represents the internal
consistent transitions which are formalized in Deﬁnitions 6 and 7.)
But, the remaining transitions may still not be equally likely. Notice that transi-
tion from ff123gg to ff12gf3gg is also non credible, since player 3 would rather
jointly deviate with player 1 and reach ff13gf2gg. That is, an internal consistent
transition will not occur if the players that force the transition are able to associate
with some (or all) players outside deviating to a more proﬁtable coalition structure.
(Digraph 3 represents the strong dominant transitions which are formally deﬁned in
Deﬁnitions 8 and 9.)
We next introduce the binary relation on P(N). But prior to deﬁning it, let us
consider a second example in order to illustrate the difﬁculties of this task.
Example 2 LetN=f1,2,3,4,5,6g and let'beapartition function suchthat '(f12gf34gf56g)=(1,2,3,4,5,6),
'(f1gf23gf4gf5gf6g)=(0,3,4,0,6,7),
'(f12gf34gf5gf6g)=(0,0,0,0,7,8), '(f12gf3gf456g)=(0,0,0,7,8,9).
Consider transition from ff12gf34gf56gg to ff1gf23gf4gf5gf6gg. In this case
three different groups of players may force this transition, namely: f235g, f236g and
f2356g. Observe that players 2 and 3 have to agree on their union and both are in all
three sets. This is because the wills of all players coming from different coalitions in
ff12gf34gf56gg and forming a new coalition in ff1gf23gf4gf5gf6gg are needed
to carry out the grouping action. However, to break coalition 56 only one players,
either 5 or 6, is strictly necessary.
If we analyze the transit from ff12gf34gf56gg to ff12gf34gf5gf6gg we have
that following three groups of players may force this transition: f5g, f6g and f56g
while transition from ff12gf34gf56gg to ff12gf3gf456gg can be carried out only
by means of the set f456g. (See Digraph 4.)
Following the ideas suggested by this example in what follows we formalize the
transitional process between the coalition structures. In such a transitional process
6we suppose that an agreement among all the involved players is needed to form a
coalition, while players, (either individually or in a group) may freely leave a coali-
tion4. We also assume that players who force a transition from one coalition structure
to another will beneﬁt with it.
Deﬁnition 3 5 Let P,Q 2 P(N). We say that P weakly dominates Q via M if there
exists a set M  N such that
i) M is the union of some (or all) coalitions in P that satisﬁes
fPnM : P 2 Pg = fQnM : Q 2 Qg,
ii) 'j(P) > 'j(Q) for all i 2 M.
The ideas lying behind this deﬁnition are the following: Condition i) says that
only players who form coalitions in P have the capacity to make the transition from
Q to P and that for a transition to occur, what is left once players in M are deleted
from Q and P, has to be equal. This last means that no player in NnM has made
the transition from Q to P; therefore, the players who have forced this transition are
contained in M. Condition ii) says that transition from Q to P should be proﬁtable
for all players in M.
Since transition from Q to P may not be uniquely determined (see Example 2)
we introduce the following deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 4 We say that Q weakly dominates P (PwdomQ) if there exists a collec-
tion of sets M = fM1;:::;Mkg 6= ; such that QwdomP via Mi for all i = 1;:::;k.
Example 2 shows that not all players in M have the same decision power to
force a transition. In the ﬁrst transition players 2 and 3 are both necessary to carry
out this action. In the second, we cannot identify any player as necessary to make
the transition since either player 5 or player 6 is able to do it. However, in the last
transition players 4, 5 and 6 are essential to make the transition.
4In treating the breaks other alternatives could have been taken. In fact, there are social situations
where the mutual agreement of the involved agents about a break is needed. (Think of a marriage
dissolution by the Rota Court in the Catholic Church.)
5This deﬁnition was introduced in Espinosa and Inarra [2000].
7In what follows, we study the structure of collection M and we classify the play-
ers that make transitions between coalition structures possible.
Consider a weak dominant transition from Q to P by means of collection M =
fM1;:::Mkg
Deﬁnition 5 A player j that belongs to every Mi in M is called essential. A player
j 2 Mi for which there exists a coalition Mk such that j = 2 Mk is called inessential.
i) For every pair Mi;Mj 2 M we have that Mi [ Mj 2 M. Consequently the
maximal set under inclusion
k S
i=1
Mi also belongs to M. Notice that this set
identiﬁes all the players, essential and inessential, who can make transition
from Q to P possible.
ii) Let P 2 P such that 'i(P) > 'i(Q) for all i 2 P. If there is no Q 2 Q such
that P  Q then P  M for all M in M. Notice that in this case coalition
P is a union of players coming from different coalitions in Q, all of them
obtaining proﬁts with transition from Q to P. Since coalition P is in every
set of M then players in it are essential in the transition from Q to P.
iii) Let P 2 P such that 'i(P) > 'i(Q) for all i 2 P. If P  Q then P is
a break of Q. Notice that in a two part break if only players in P beneﬁt
from the transition then these players are essential. However, if players in
P and QnP beneﬁt with the transition then all players in Q are inessential.
In general, if a coalition Q breaks into several parts and all its players proﬁt
with that break, all players in Q are inessential, while the existence of just
one coalition P in this break with at least one player who does not proﬁt
from the transition implies that all players in QnP are essential.
Once we have established the weak dominant transitions from Q to all the coali-
tion structures, we try to identify which of them are more likely to occur. In fact,
Deﬁnition 4 only requires players in every Mi of M to gain with transition from Q
to P. Considering all the weak dominant transitions from a given coalition structure
8there may be reasons why one transition is more plausible than other. Here, we will
discuss one such reason: Internal consistency.
Let M 2 M and M0 2 M0 where M and M0 are collections of sets which allow
transitions from Q to P and from Q to P0 respectively. Suppose that M0  M and
that players in M0 obtain higher payoffs than in M. Then it seems unlikely that a
transition from Q to P via M will take place, since the players in M 0 will probably
not inform the players in MnM0 about an upcoming transition to P0, which they can
make without their cooperation. If this happens for every M in M then transition
from Q to P will be removed. In what follows we deﬁne this idea.
Deﬁnition 6 We say that PwdomQ via M is internally consistent if there is no other
P0 such that P0wdomQ via M0 with M0  M and 'i(P0) > 'i(P) for all i 2 M0.
Deﬁnition 7 We say that PwdomQ is internally consistent if there is at least one
M 2 M such that PwdomQ via M is internally consistent.
In Example 2 we observe that starting from ff12gf34gf56gg, inessential play-
ers 5 and 6 may force transition to ff12gf34gf5gf6gg, blocking the weakly dom-
inant transition to ff1gf23gf4gf5gf6gg via f235g, f236g and f2356g, hence the
transition to coalition structure ff1gf23gf4gf5gf6gg will not occur and should be
removed.
Once more, we may still observe the survival of non credible transitions. That
is, even if transition from Q to P is internally consistent there may still be reasons
why it may not be plausible. For example, it may happen that the players in M
seeking cooperation with some (or all) players outside forming for example M 0 can
obtain greater payoffs, say in P0. In this case players in M will prefer to go to P0,
provided that this transition is also internally consistent, rather than to P. This idea
is formalized below.
Deﬁnition 8 Let transition from Q to P via M be internally consistent. We say that
P strongly dominates Q via M if there is no other internally consistent transition
from Q to P0 via M0 with M  M0 and 'i(P0) > 'i(P) for all i 2 M0:
9Deﬁnition 9 We say that P strongly dominates Q (PsdomQ) if there is at least one
M 2 M such that PsdomQ via M.
Observe that transitions from ff12gf34gf56gg to ff12gf34gf5gf6gg and to
ff12gf3gf456gg are both internally consistent in Example 2. However, since players
4, 5 and 6 prefer to go to ff12gf3gf456gg then this last coalition structure strongly
dominates ff12gf34gf56gg while the other not.
Thus, we have that Deﬁnitions 4, 7 and 9 give rise to the coalitional system
(P(N);sdom) introduced in Deﬁnition 2.
In what follows we show some properties of the binary relation sdom.
Theorem 1 The binary relation sdom on P(N) is neither reﬂexive, complete nor
transitive, but asymmetric6.
Proof. It is immediate that sdom on P(N) is not reﬂexive. Example 3 shows that it
is neither complete nor transitive. To prove asymmetry requires a bit more work. Let
PwdomQ. Then there exists at least one set M such that PwdomQ via M. In this
case we show there is no set R such that QwdomP via R.
Since all players in M have higher payoffs in P than in Q then any set that could
force transition from P to Q via R should satisfy that R\M = ;. On the other hand,
Condition i) of Deﬁnition 3 requires M to be the union of some (or all) coalitions in
P such that PnM = QnM and we know that players M are organized differently in
Q than in P (otherwise they would not force transition from Q to P.) But in this case
we have that PnR 6= QnR, and consequently there is no set R such that QwdomP
via R, and Q does not weakly dominate P.
Since the set of strong dominant transitions is a subset of the weak dominant
transitions, we have that sdom is asymmetric.
Let us ﬁnish this section with a discussion on the strong dominance relation.
6A binary relation R on X is reﬂexive if for all x 2 X, xRx. It is complete if for all x;y 2 X,
xRy or yRx. It is transitive if for all x;y;z 2 X, xRy & yRz ) xRz. It is assymetric if for all
x;y 2 X xRy ) :yRx.
10In this paper, players are myopic in the sense that they only think of those transi-
tions that can be made in just one stage; they do not consider in their decisions what
is going to happen later on. Consequently, from a given coalition structure, and by
looking at the payoff vectors, we are able to identify those transitions which are more
likely to occur and rule out the non plausible ones. As we have described above, our
selection of transitions is made in two consecutive steps.
Inthe ﬁrststep the validity ofany weak dominant transition via M ischecked
against any other weak dominant transition via subsets of M. (See Examples
1 and 2).
That is, an internal consistency criterion is considered. This criterion differs from
the one usually applied in game theory, which accounts for further deviations from
the deviation under consideration7. In our setting, we analyze whether deviating from
a to b is more likely than deviating from a to c. We do not consider whether after
deviating from a to b another deviation to c is going to occur. The following example
shows that the two approaches are different.
Example 3 Let N=f1,2,3,4,5,6g be a set of players and consider that function '
gives the following payoff vectors: '(f12gf34gf56g) = (1;1;1;1;1;1), '(f135gf2gf4gf6g) =
(2;0;2;0;2;0), '(f13gf2gf4gf5gf6g) = (3;0;3;0;0;0).
In accordance with Deﬁnitions 4, 7 and 9, transition from ff12gf34gf56gg to
ff135gf2gf4gf5gg can be forced by essential players 1, 3 and 5, while there will be
not atransition fromff12gf34gf56gg to ff13gf2gf4gf5gf6gg. However, transition
from ff135gf2gf4gf5gg to ff13gf2gf4gf5gf6gg can be made by essential players
1 and 3.
Withfarsighted players itcould beargued that fromff12gf34gf56gg toff135gf2gf4gf6gg
transition viaf135g wouldnot occur since there isasecond transition fromff135gf2gf4gf5gg
to ff13gf2gf4gf5gf6gg that would damage player 5, an essential player in making
the ﬁrst transition under consideration. (See Digraph 5.)
7See Chew [1994] for a study of farsighted stability.
11In the second step the validity of any internally consistent transition via M is
checked against any other internal consistent transition via supersets of M.
(See Examples 1 and 2.)
That is, an external consistency criterion is considered. The idea behind this cri-
terion is that after players in M have accounted for any possible internal defections,
they take into account the possibility of going to other coalition structures with some
(or all) of the remaining players.
Once we have established all the weak dominant transitions from a given coali-
tion structure to all the others, it is interesting to learn whether the application of
this two-step ﬁltering process assures that some transitions are left. As we shall see
the lemma presented below answers this question in the afﬁrmative. However, the
simultaneous application of both internal and external consistency criteria to the set
of weak dominant transitions from a given coalition structure does not guarantee that
at least one strong dominant transition remains. The following example shows this.
Example 4 Let N=f1,2,3,4,g and let ' be a partition function such that
'(f123gf4g)=(1,1,1,1), '(f1234g)=(4,4,4,4), '(f1gf23gf4g)=(5,0,0,0),
'(f13gf2gf4g)=(6,0,2,0) and '(f12gf3gf4g)=(0,0,3,0).
In this example we analyze the four weak dominant transitions that can be made
from coalition structure ff123gf4gg. Thus, transition from ff123gf4gg to ff1234gg
via f1234g is removed by internal consistency using transition to ff1gf23gf4gg via
f1g. This transition in turn is removed by external consistency using transition to
ff13gf2gf4gg via f13g, which is also taken out by internal consistency by transi-
tion to ff12gf3gf4gg via f3g. Moreover, this last transition is removed using ex-
ternal consistency by means of transition to ff1234gg. Therefore no weak dominant
transitions are left using both criteria simultaneously. (See Digraph 6.)
Additionally, we believe that the idea of applying ﬁrst the internal consistency
criterion looking at what happens inside M and after looking outside M is consistent
with some social situations8.
8For example, prior to take any decision, any group of allied countries analyzes its internal con-
sistency and only then are alliances with other countries taken into account.
12Now let us present a lemma which guarantees that our ﬁltering process when
applied to the weak dominant transitions from a given coalition structure allows the
survival of at least one transition.
Lemma 2 If QwdomP then there exists a coalition structure P0 such that P0sdomQ.
Proof. Assume that PwdomQ. Then there exists a collection M that can force
transition from Q to P. If this transition is not internally consistent, then, by Deﬁni-
tions 4 and 7, we have that for every set in M there are subsets of players in other
coalition structures which weakly dominate Q, with higher payoffs. Thus, we may
have a sequence of coalition structures each of which is removed by another until
an internally consistent transition is reached. Since every set in M is removed by a
subset of players, cycling in the sequence is impossible, and an internally consistent
transition will be reached in a ﬁnite number of steps.
If the last coalition structure in the sequence above strongly dominates Q, then
we are done. If not, there exists a sequence of coalition structures each of which is
removed by another until a strong dominant transition is reached. This will necessar-
ily happen in a ﬁnite number of steps since every set in M is removed by a superset,
which again makes cycling in the sequence impossible.
To conclude we want to stress that the removal of the non credible transitions
may yet leave some ’incompatible’ transitions. That is, considering the set of tran-
sitions from one coalition structure some players may be involved in two or more
different transitions. (In Example 1, there are two strongly dominant transitions from
ff1,2,3gg to ff13gf2gg and to ff23gf1gg via f13g and f23g respectively and player
3 is an essential player in both of them.) All in all, we think that even though the ﬁl-
tering process we have deﬁned does not allow us to know exactly what transitions are
going to happen, an important number of non credible transitions have been removed,
making the subsequent application of solution concepts easier.
3 The absorbing sets solution for abstract systems
In the ﬁrstpart ofthis section wedeﬁnethe absorbing sets solution for abstract games.
Then, we deﬁne a second solution: The generalized stable sets solution and we es-
13tablish the relation between the two. As we shall see this relationship will be of use
in the following section.
Let (X;R) be an abstract system. For a;b 2 X, aRb means that a dominates b.
A path from a to b in X is a sequence of alternatives a = a0;a1;a2;:::am = b 2
X such that ai 1Rai for all i 2 f1;:::;mg.
Let RT be the transitive closure of R (i.e. aRTb means that there is a path from
a to b).
Now let us consider the deﬁnition of an absorbing set.
Deﬁnition 10 Let (X;R) be an abstract system. A nonempty A  X is called an
absorbing set if
i) for all a;b 2 A (a 6= b): aRTb,
ii) there is no b 2 XnA and a 2 A such that bRTa.
The absorbing sets solution for an abstract system (X;R) is the collection of all
its absorbing sets.
Each of the absorbing sets satisﬁes two conditions. Condition i) says that in
any two alternatives in an absorbing set one dominates the other, if not directly then
through a path. Condition ii) says that no alternative outside the absorbing set domi-
nates an alternative in the set, even through a path.
The notion of stability lying on the absorbing sets solution may be understood as
follows. Suppose that at some point in time an alternative in an absorbing set A is
reached, then all alternatives in A will be visited an inﬁnite number of times, while
no alternative outside A will ever be visited again.
Now, we show that every abstract system has at least one absorbing set. Consid-
ering Theorem 1 in Kalai and Schmeidler [1977] 9 which states that if X is ﬁnite the
admissible set (which is the union of all its absorbing sets) is always nonempty, we
can state (without proof) the following theorem:
Theorem 3 Let(X;R) be an abstract game. Then (X;R) has at least one absorbing
set.
9See also Theorem 2:5 in Shenoy [1979] :
14Let us now deﬁne the generalized stable sets solution and analyze its relation with
the absorbing sets solution.
As is known, the von Neumann and Morgenstern stable sets solution suffers from
the drawback that not every abstract game has a stable set. One can show however,
that this solution always exists if the binary relation R is transitive. This property was
utilized by van Deemen [1991] to introduce yet another solution concept for abstract
systems, the generalized stable sets solution10. Formally,
Deﬁnition 11 Let (X;R) be an abstract system. A nonempty A  X is called a
generalized stable set if it is a stable set for (X;RT), or equivalently if
i) for all a;b 2 A(a 6= b): :aRTb,
ii) for all b 2 XnA there exists a 2 A such that aRTb.
The generalized stable sets solution for an abstract system (X;R) is the collec-
tion of all its generalized stable sets.
Condition i) says that in any two distinct alternatives in the generalized stable set
neither dominates the other, not even through a path. Condition ii) says that every
alternative outside this set is dominated by some alternative in the generalized stable
set, either directly or through a path.
A nice property of this solution is that every abstract system has at least one
generalized stable set.
In what follows, we establish the relationship between the generalized stable sets
solution and the absorbing sets solution.
Notice ﬁrst that Conditions i) of the two solutions are exactly opposite. Moreover
we ﬁnd that any set formed by picking up one element of each of the absorbing sets
is generalized stable. Let us see this.
Theorem 4 Let fA1;:::;Akg be the absorbing sets solution of the abstract system
(X;R). Then S is a generalized stable set if and only if jS \Aij = 1 for i = 1;:::;k.
10This solution does not give a proper generalization of the vN&M stable set, i.e. even if a stable
set exists, it is not necessarily a generalized stable set.
15Proof. Let S  X. We will show ﬁrst that S cannot be a generalized stable set
if there exists an absorbing set Ai for which jS \ Aij 6= 1. So, let Ai be such an
absorbing set and assume that jS \ Aij = 0, i.e. S  XnAi. Now, choose a 2 Ai.
Then, by Condition ii) of the absorbing set deﬁnition we know that there is no b 2 S
such that bRTa. Then S cannot be a generalized stable set, since its Condition ii) is
violated. Now assume that jS\Aij > 1. Then choose a;b 2 S\Ai. By Condition i)
of the absorbing set deﬁnition, we have aRTb. Then S cannot be a generalized stable
set, since its Condition i) is violated.
Now assume that jS \ Aij = 1 for i = 1;:::;k. To prove that Condition i)
of a generalized stable set holds, let a;b 2 S. Then a and b must be in different
absorbing sets, say a 2 Ai and b 2 Aj. Applying Condition ii) of the absorbing set
deﬁnition to Ai we obtain :bRTa, and applying it to Aj we obtain :aRTb. To prove
that Condition ii) of a generalized stable set holds, notice the following remark: An
element in X not belonging to any absorbing set is dominated (directly or through
a path) by the elements of at least one absorbing set. Now, let S \ Ai = ai for
i = 1;:::;k and consider the set XnS. If an element of XnS, call it b, is in any Ai,
then by Condition i) of the absorbing set deﬁnition we have aiRTb. However, if b
is not in any Ai then by the previous remark we have aiRTb. Hence, any element
in XnS is dominated (directly or through a path) by an ai, and Condition ii) of the
generalized stable set deﬁnition follows.
The following corollary will be of interest in Section 4.
Corollary 5 Let A = fa1;:::;akg be the unique absorbing set of the abstract system
(X;R). Then each set faig i = 1;:::;k is generalized stable.
4 Symmetric cooperative systems
In this section we introduce a class of coalitional systems that we call symmetric
cooperative. As we shall see in Section 5 this class contains some systems derived
from coalition formation problems in socioeconomic contexts.
Now let us summarize the results of this section.
We ﬁnd that each symmetric cooperative system has exactly one absorbing set
which contains the grand coalition. This last property is desirable, since by assump-
16tion in our class of systems the grand coalition is the efﬁcient outcome. Furthermore,
we are able to identify the type of coalition structures in the absorbing set as well as
the transitions between them. Finally by Corollary 5 we have that each of the coali-
tion structures in the unique absorbing set is a generalized stable set in the sense of
van Deemen.
In what follows we establish four assumptions on the partition function ' pre-
ceded by an explanatory idea. The coalitional system derived from these restrictions
on ' is called symmetric cooperative.
First, let us introduce some notation.
Let P = fP1;:::;Plg be a coalition structure. For the sake of simplicity, we
consider that coalitions in P are arranged in non increasing order according to their
size, that is, jP1j  jP2j  :::  jPlj.
All players forming a coalition receive the same payoff.
A.1: Let Pk be a coalition in P and let i;j be two players such that i;j 2 Pk.
Then 'i(Pk,P) = 'j(Pk;P).
Taking into account this assumption, hereafter we denote by 'i(Pk;P) the payoff
of any player i in Pk, Pk 2 P, by '(flg;P) the payoff of player l in P, and by
'i(fNg) the payoff of any player in fNg where P = fNg.
All players in equal sized coalitions of a coalition structure P re-
ceive the same payoff. Players in coalitions of smaller size of a coali-
tion structure P receive strictly greater payoffs than players in coali-
tions of larger sizes.
A.2: Let Pk, Pr be two distinct coalitions in P such that jPrj = jPkj. Then
'i(Pk;P) = 'i(Pr;P). If jPrj < jPkj. Then 'i(Pk;P) < 'i(Pr;P).
17Nowassume that total cooperation isthe”efﬁcient coalition structure”. Ofcourse,
this assumption does not imply that every player in the grand coalition receives a pay-
off greater than the payoff he receives in any other coalition structure. In that case
the problem of stability would be trivial. Our analysis is focused rather on situations
where some players are interested in deviating from the efﬁcient outcome.





Notice that by assumption A.2, we know that the players in the smallest coalition
of any coalition structure receive the greatest payoff. Hence, these players are the
ﬁrst candidates to object to the transition to the grand coalition (and also to every
other coalition structure dominated by fNg). This suggests the deﬁnition of a set of
non dominated coalition structures, denoted by nD, that plays an important role in
the obtaining of our results. Formally
nD = fP 2 P(N) : 'i(Pl;P)  'i(fNg).
In words, nD contains those coalition structures not dominated by the grand
coalition. However in this set there are two types of coalition structure: i) Coali-
tion structures whose single deviators give rise to coalition structures again in nD. In
this case, by Assumption A.3, the coalition structures generated have the following
characteristic: ”The payoff of any single deviator is higher than the payoff of any
player in the largest coalition of any other coalition structure in nD”. ii) Coalition
structures whose single deviators give rise to coalition structures not in nD. In this
second case the coalition structures generated may not have the characteristic men-
tioned and what the following assumption does is simply to require them to do so.
Single deviation is always preferred to be in the worst position of
any coalition structure in nD.
18A.4: Let Q 2 nD and let Qd be a coalition structure that arises when a single
player deviates from Q. Then
'(flg;Qd)  'i(P1;P) for all P 2 nD.
From this we have the following remark.
Remark 1 Assumption A.4 implies that single deviation from any coalition structure
in nD is proﬁtable. (To see this replace P by Q).11
In what follows we introduce Lemmas 6 and 7 to be used in Theorem 8, the main
result of this section.
Lemma 6 Suppose that fNgwdomQ. Then either fNgsdomQ or there exists a
coalition structure P such that PsdomQ, where the largest coalitions in P are at
most the size of the largest coalitions in Q.
Proof. If fNgsdomQ then Lemma 6 follows. If this is not the case, then by Lemma
2 there exists a coalition structure P and a set of players M   N such that PsdomQ
via M. Notice that P 2 nD. On the other hand Assumptions A.2 and A.3 imply
that 'i(P1;P)  'i(fNg). Hence P1 \ M = ;, that is players in P1 cannot force
transition from Q to P. Since players in P1 are not in M (see Deﬁnition 5 i) and ii))
the cardinality of P1 cannot be greater than the cardinality of Q1. So we have proved
that the largest coalition in P is at most the size of the largest coalition in Q. It also
easily follows that if there are several equal sized largest coalitions in P and in Q,
then the number of these coalitions in P is at most the number in Q.
Lemma 7 If fNg does not weakly dominate Q then QdsdomQ.
Proof. First notice that if fNg does not weakly dominate Q then Remark 1 guaran-
tees that Qd weak dominates Q. Now assume that Qd does not strongly dominate Q.
Then by Lemma 2 there exists a coalition structure P and a set of players M such
11Notice that this assumption does not imply that single deviation from any coalition structure in
￿
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stated in the proof of Lemma 7 and emphasized in the ﬁnal conclusion of this theorem.
19that PsdomQ via M. Notice that P 2 nD. Additionally, players in M are either
single deviators from any coalition of Q receiving '(flg;Qd) or/and singletons in
Q receiving more than 'i(fNg). By Assumption A.4 we know that '(flg;Qd) 
'i(P1;P) and since P 2 nD we also know that 'i(fNg)  'i(P1;P). Conse-
quently P1 \ M = ; and P1  Qi, Qi 2 Q. Since jQij > 1 then a player
k 2 (P1 \ Qi) will single deviate from Q giving rise to Qd. This player will not
be member of M and therefore Qd will strongly dominate Q. So we have arrived at
a contradiction and Lemma 7 follows.
Theorem 8 Every symmetric cooperative system has exactly one absorbing set and
that set contains fNg.
Proof. It is sufﬁcient to show that starting from an arbitrary coalition structure Q
we can always arrive at coalition structure fNg, i.e. there is a sequence of coalition
structures fNg = Qk;:::;Q0 = Q such that QjsdomQj 1 for all j = 1;:::;k.
Two cases can be considered, Q 2 nD and Q = 2 nD.
Case i) Q 2 nD. In this case fNg does not weakly dominate Q. Then by
Lemma 7, we know that QdsdomQ. This type of deviation occurs as long as the
resulting coalition structure from single deviation belongs to nD. Hence, there will
be a sequence of coalition structures each of which deviates from the coalition of
largest size until we arrive at a coalition structure which is dominated by fNg, a
possibility that we analyze in Case ii).
Case ii) Q = 2 nD. Now Q is weakly dominated by fNg. In this case, by Lemma
6, either fNgsdomQ (in which case we are in fNg and Theorem 8 is done) or there
is a coalition structure, say Qt, whose largest coalitions are at most the size of the
largest coalitions in Q. Notice that Qt belongs to nD. Hence, if transition to fNg
is not directly reached then we arrive at a coalition structure whose largest coalitions
do not increase. We are back in Case i) and single deviation process from the largest
coalition starts.
But the process described necessarily has an end. Therefore, in a ﬁnite number
of steps we arrive at a coalition structure strongly dominated by fNg.
Corollary 9 In the absorbing set of a symmetric cooperative system, either fNg is
20the unique coalition structure of the set or there is at least one coalition structure
dominated by fNg.
Proof. By Theorem 8 we know that the unique absorbing set of a symmetric coop-
erative system contains fNg. Assume that fNg is not the unique element of the set.
Then the by deﬁnition of absorbing sets, in any two elements of the set one strongly
dominates the other, if not directly then through a path. Then at least one coalition
structure has to be strongly dominated by fNg.
Notice that this result can be interpreted as analogous to the prisoner dilemma
result. It exhibits an undesirable consequence of players’ myopic behavior, which
may lead players to transit to dominated outcomes.
Additionally, we want to emphasize that the result that the grand coalition is in
the unique absorbing set is not trivial. In the following example, we can see that the
absorbing set may not contain fNg even though it is the efﬁcient outcome.
Example 5 Assume a partition function ' that satisﬁes assumptions A.1, A.2 and
A.3. These assumptions allow us to write the partition function considering only the
sizes of coalitions in the coalition structures. That is, for any coalition structure P =
fP1;:::;Plg, let (p1;:::;pl) be the vector whose entries represent the sizes of coali-
tions in P, call it coalition-size vector. Denote by '(pi) the payoff of any player in Pi.
Now consider the following numerical example. Let f1;2;3;4;5;6;7g be the set of
players and assume that function ' gives the following payoff vectors: '(7) = (50),
'(6;1) = (30;70), '(5;2) = (35;60), '(4;3) = (40;55), '(5;1;1) = (25;65;65),
'(4;2;1) = (30;20;65), '(3;3;1) = (35;35;65), '(3;2;2) = (35;40;40), '(4;1;1;1) =
(20;53;53;53), '(3;2;1;1) = (25;30;53;53), '(2;2;2;1) = (30;30;30;53), '(3;1;1;1;1) =
(15;40;40;40;40), '(2;2;1;1;1) = (20;20;35;35;35), '(2;1;1;1;1;1) =
(10;25;25;25;25;25), '(1;1;1;1;1;1;1) = (15;15;15;15;15;15;15).
Digraph 7 shows the absorbing set for the symmetric cooperative system of this
example. This set is formed by coalition structures represented by the following
coalition-size vectors: (5;2), (4;3), (5;1;1), (4;2;1), (3;3;1), (4;1;1;1), (3;2;1;1).
Notice that the efﬁcient outcome (7) is not in the absorbing set.
21Now, applying the generalized stable sets solution to the symmetric cooperative
systems we have the following result.
Proposition 10 Each coalition structure in the unique absorbing set is a generalized
stable set.
Proof. Recall that the deﬁnition of the generalized stable sets solution has to satisfy
two conditions. The ﬁrst requires that neither of any two distinct alternatives in each
generalized stable set dominates the other, even through a path. By Corollary 5, we
know that each generalized stable set contains only one coalition structure, hence this
condition is satisﬁed by vacuity. The second condition requires that any alternative
outside a generalized stable set is dominated by some alternative in that set, either
directly or through a path, which in the present case is obviously true.
Let us conclude this section emphasizing the type of coalition structures and the
transitions in the absorbing set of a symmetric cooperative system.
i) fNg is contained in the unique absorbing set. ii) Coalition structures in the
set nD are certainly related through single deviations. They may also be related
through transitions which lead to more ”internally balanced” coalition structures, that
is coalition structures whose largest coalitions do not grow. iii) There is also at least
one transition from a coalition structure not in nD to the grand coalition. Moreover,
if from a coalition structure not in nD, the transition to the grand coalition does
not exist, then there will be another transition which will lead to a more balanced
coalition structure in nD:
5 Examples
In this section we introduce a model and a numerical example, both giving rise to
symmetric cooperative systems. The ﬁrst, mainly illustrative, shows clearly the re-
sults obtained in the previous section. The second is a numerical example for 5
players that corresponds to the well-known standard Cournot oligopoly model.
225.1 A social organization system
Let N be a group of countries which consider the possibility of forming social orga-
nizations (coalition structures) with the aim of obtaining common beneﬁts. Think for
example of the groupings of countries for opening markets, for example the European
Union, the American Common Market and coalitions of countries for defense such
as NATO.
Consider that the beneﬁts of the entire group depend on the degree of cooperation
of its members, measured by the number of social institutions they organize. In par-
ticular assume for the sake of simplicity that the degree of cooperation is represented
by the following linear function: u(P) = jNj   (jPj   1) for all P 2 P(N) where
jNj = nisthe number of countries participating in the social organization and jPj the
number of social institutions formed by them. Hence, u(fNg) = n denotes the bene-
ﬁts of the unique social organization derived when total cooperation is reached, while
u(P) = 1 denotes the beneﬁts when the degenerated social organization formed by
singletons takes place.
Furthermore, assume that social norms and custom impose an equal division of
the proﬁts from cooperation. In accordance with this idea we assume that coalitional
proﬁts are 1
jPj of total beneﬁts and that each country receives 1
jPij of coalitional ben-
eﬁts. Hence in this model the payoff of each country is given by
u(Pi;P) =
jNj   (jPj   1)
jPijjPj
.
Proposition 11 The payoff function u satisﬁes Assumptions A.1-A.4.
Proof. See the appendix
Let us illustrate this model with a numerical example.
Example 6 LetN = f1;2;3;4g bethe set ofcountries. Let(4)(3,1) (2,2) (2,1,1) and
(1,1,1,1) be the coalition-size vectors representing the coalition structures that can
be formed with the set N. (For example (3,1) indicates a coalition structure formed
by a coalition of 3 countries and a coalition of 1 country respectively). According to



















Digraph 8 represents the symmetric cooperative system associated with this example,
where the absorbing set has been determined.
5.2 An example on Cournot oligopoly system12
Consider a set of ﬁrms with identical cost structure competing ` a la Cournot. Market
demand is assumed to be Q = a   p, a > 0, where Q is the aggregate output and
p the price. We assume that any group of ﬁrms may form a coalition and in that
case share its coalitional proﬁt equally. The cost function for any coalition of ﬁrms is
assumed to be C(QT) = cQT, where c 2 [0;a) and QT is the output of coalition T.
Given a coalition structure P (a market structure in this setting) we also assume that
any coalition of ﬁrms T  N maximizes proﬁts. By solving this problem for each




(T;P) denotes the proﬁts of a ﬁrm in a coalition of T ﬁrms in the market struc-
ture P.13
Notice that for this model only the market structure formed by singletons can be
sustained as a Nash equilibrium, since any single deviation is proﬁtable. However,
the result obtained with our approach is different, since the market structure formed
by singletons will not necessarily be in the absorbing set.
Example 7 Let N = f1;2;3;4;5g be the set of ﬁrms. Suppose, for the sake of
simplicity that a = 1 and c = 0. Coalition-size vectors (5), (4;1), (3;2), (3;1;1),
(2;2;1), (2;1;1;1), (1;1;1;1;1) represent the market structures that can be formed
with 5 identical ﬁrms. For example, (3;2) indicates a duopoly formed by 3 and 2
12See Bloch [1996], Ray and Vohra [1997], Espinosa and Inarra [2000] and Espinosa, Grafe and
Inarra [2001] for a study of the stability of market structures for a Cournot oligopoly model with
ﬁxed costs. See also Yi [1997].
13The Cournot oligopoly model derives to a symmetric cooperative system. In order to prove this
it can be shown that the Cournot proﬁt function satisﬁes the four assumptions established on the
partition function of Section 4 but this is studied in another paper. See Inarra, Kuipers and Olaizola
[2001].






































Digraph 9 represents the symmetric cooperative system associated with this ex-
ample, where the absorbing set has been identiﬁed.
It can be easily seen that the market structures of the absorbing set for this sym-
metric cooperative system are given by: (5), (4;1), (3;1;1) and (2;1;1;1), while
(3;2), (2;2;1) and (1;1;1;1;1) represent non stable market structures.
256 Appendix
6.1 Proof of proposition 9
We show that function u satisﬁes the assumptions established in Section 4.
Assumptions A.1 and A.2 are satisﬁed since u is strictly decreasing in the number
of coalitions and on the number of players in each coalition. It can easily be seen that
Assumption A.3 is also satisﬁed. To prove Assumption A.4 needs a bit more work.
This assumption requires:
'(flg;Qd)  'i(P1;P) for all P 2 uD,
where nD = fP 2 P(N) : 'i(Pl;P) > 'if(Ngg.
We ﬁrst study the set nD.
Let jNj = n and jPj = r, and let the smallest coalition in P be a singleton, i.e.
Pl = flg. In our model the inequality




Given n we determine the maximal r, denoted by r, that satisﬁes the last inequality.




if n is odd and r =
n
2
if n is even.
As function u is strictly decreasing in r; if Assumption A.4 is satisﬁed for r then it
is also satisﬁed for any coalition structure of size r < r in nD. (See the explanation
that follows Assumption A.4). Additionally, simple algebraic calculations show that
every coalition structure of size r in nD contains a singleton.
Now, let us check whether Assumption A.4 is satisﬁed for r.
Case i) n is odd. In this case the payoff of a single deviator from a coalition
structure of size r is exactly 1. Since the payoff of players in the largest coalitions
of all the coalition structures in nD are strictly smaller than 1 Assumption A.4 is
satisﬁed for this case.
26Case ii) n is even. In this case the exact payoff of the single deviator from any
coalition structure of size r is n
n+2. On the other hand we have
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